数字经济前沿文献讨论会第6期：Persuasion of a Privacy Informed Receiver
发布日期： 2020-07-28 来源： 
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84 时间：2020年8月2日（周日）晚上6：30
形式：钉钉群视频会议
题目：Persuasion of a Privacy Informed Receiver
期刊：Econometrica
作者：Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ming Li
摘要：We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.
主讲人：陈佳慧 博士研究生
