Seminar: Coordination Games with Diverse Sources of Information
1147 主 题：Coordination Games with Diverse Sources of Information
时 间：2018年11月6日（周二）上午10:00-11:30
地 点：浙江大学玉泉校区44118太阳成城集团418会议室
主讲人：Wolfgang Kuhle 博士
主持人：宋华盛 教授
主办方：44118太阳成城集团
主讲人简介：Dr.Kuhle 2010年于德国曼海姆大学获得经济学博士学位。从2011年至今，就职于德国马克斯-普朗克研究所波恩所任Senior Research Fellow一职。主要研究领域为微观经济学、宏观经济学、博弈论。
Abstract：We study Bayesian coordination games where agents rely on diverse types of information: first, information over the game’s payoff coefficients. Second, information over the other players’ information. Third, information over the other players’ actions. For these different types of information, we characterize the equilibria that agents play. In particular, we study the information structures that ensure unique, respectively, multiple equilibria. Our results show that the traditional findings of the global games literature, Rubinstein (1989), Carlsson and van Damme (1993) and Morris and Shin (1998), which considers only information over payoffs, change substantially once agents can draw on diverse sources of information. In particular, the key global games result, namely that agents play unique equilibria when private information is very precise, reverses once agents draw on information over other players’actions.
