关于“信息传递和廉价交谈讲座”的通知
1629 主讲人：Peter Norman，University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
主持人：汪淼军（经济学系教授）
时间：
1 Cheap talk and Information Transmission 11月24日9:30-11:30
2 Persuasion Games and Information Transmission 11月24日14:30-16:30
地点：浙江大学玉泉校区44118太阳成城集团501室
主要内容：
Many recent advances in economic theory are related to acquisition and transmission of information between various agents. Real world examples include information aggregation in voting, jury trials, advertising, and, more generally, transactions between buyers and sellers in which sellers have private information. In this course we will focus on the strategic relationship between experts and decision makers, which is complicated (and therefore becomes interesting) by the possibility that the expert(s) may have deferent preferences from the decision maker(s).
We still study two classes of models. The first, which are referred to as models of cheap talk, is based to the assumption that the expert has private information about some state of the world that a decision maker would like to know in order to make better decisions. In these models, the expert or experts send costless messages to the decision maker(s) and the most fundamental question in such a model is whether it is possible for informative communication to be sustained as an equilibrium outcome. Another approach is to assume that it is possible to provide .hard information. That is, unlike cheap talk models, the assumption is that the information provided is correct. However, even in this case it is possible to manipulate the decision maker by controlling the precision of the information being provided. A recent version of this strand of research is referred to as persuasion games, and these models are currently generating quite a
bit of attention due to their tractability.
